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JURISDICTION 
This is Respondent's Interlocutory Appeal, brought pursuant to 
§ 78-2-2(3) (e) (ii) U.C.A. and accepted by this Court on August 9, 
1996. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court was correct in its 
determination that this proceeding is an original independent 
action in which a review of a transcript of the Tax Commission 
proceedings is not necessary. 
Issue preserved below: R. 125. 
Standard of Review: This is a legal question of statutory 
interpretation, reviewed for correctness. State v. Vigil, 842 P. 2d 
843 (Utah 1992). 
2. Whether the district court was correct that the 
independent nature of this proceeding deprived the Tax Commission's 
ruling of a presumption of correctness, and consequent 
enforceability; and whether payment of the tax was therefore 
necessary to a de novo proceeding in the district court. 
Issue preserved below: R. 125. 
Standard of Review: Same as above. 
3. If a transcript is ordered, is there a requirement as to 
who must pay for it and have it prepared? 
Issue preserved below: R. 125. 
Standard of Review: Same as above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE. 
§ 59-1-301. Payment under protest -- Action to recover. 
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for 
public revenue which is deemed unlawful by the party whose 
property is taxed, or from whom the tax or license is demanded 
or enforced, that party may pay under protest the tax or 
license, or any part deemed unlawful, to the officers 
designated and authorized by law to collect the tax or 
license; and then the party so paying or a legal 
representative may bring an action in the tax division of the 
appropriate district court against the officer to whom the tax 
or license was paid, or against the state, county, 
municipality, or other taxing entity on whose behalf it was 
collected, to recover the tax or license or any portion of the 
tax or license paid under protest. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-202.01(9)(a): 
"Record" means all books, letters, documents, papers, maps, 
plans, photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings, 
electronic data, or other documentary materials regardless of 
physical form or characteristics which are prepared, owned, 
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received, or retained by the judicial branch, and where all of 
the information in the original is reproducible by photocopy 
or other mechanical or electronic means. 
§ 59-1-601 U.C.A. 
District court jurisdiction. 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in § 63-46b-
15, beginning July 1, 1994, the district court shall have 
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions by 
the commission resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means 
an original, independent proceeding, and does not mean a 
trial de novo on the record. 
(3) In any appeal taken after July l, 1994, from a 
formal hearing to the district court pursuant to this 
section, the commission shall certify a record of its 
proceedings to the district court which record shall be 
reviewed and considered by the district court. A 
district court may not, unless the parties otherwise 
agree in writing, hear witnesses that were not called to 
testify or consider exhibits that were not presented to 
the commission at the formal hearing. If the parties do 
not agree, and a district court determines that 
additional witnesses should be heard or additional 
exhibits considered in the interest of justice, the 
district court shall remand the case to the commission 
for that purpose. This subsection supersedes § 63-46b-l6 
pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
§ 59-1-607 U.C.A 
Decision of District Court as final determination. 
Unless stayed, the decision of the district court shall 
be binding on all parties until changed upon appeal. If 
no appeal is taken, the decision of the court shall 
constitute a final determination of the matter. 
§ 63-46b-16 U.C.A. 
Judicial review -- Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(l) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final 
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
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(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency 
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, 
the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency 
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form 
required by the appellate rules of the appropriate 
appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate 
appellate court shall govern all additional filings and 
proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Appellate procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of 
preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably 
refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize 
the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, 
on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule 
on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional 
on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
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(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed 
in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated 
to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency 
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 11. The Record on Appeal. 
(See Appendix). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellee accepts Appellant's Statement of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under the law as enacted in 1994, a decision of the Tax 
Commission may be reviewed by an original independent action in the 
district court, and a trial de novo. The trial is not "on the 
record" and is conducted as if the action was first filed in the 
district court. A transcript of the hearing in the Tax Commission 
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is not necessary, and need not be reviewed as part of the trial de 
novo. 
Because the decision of the Tax Commission is deprived of its 
finality and its presumption of correctness, the taxes assessed by 
the Commission are not required to be paid as a condition of 
proceeding in the district court. 
If a transcript of the Tax Commission proceedings is ordered, 
there is nothing in the statutes which require the taxpayer to 
order it or pay for it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF SECTION 59-1-601 REQUIRES THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO CONDUCT "AN ORIGINAL, INDEPENDENT PROCEEDING" AND NOT "A 
TRIAL DE NOVO ON THE RECORD." 
The proceeding below was brought in the District Court 
pursuant to § 59-1-601 U.C.A. That statute makes it clear that 
this proceeding is an original independent proceeding, and not a 
review on the record made in the Utah State Tax Commission. The 
statute authorizing this proceeding is entirely new, as of July 1, 
1994. The proceeding is not a "judicial review" in the same sense 
as that spoken of § 63-46b-16 U.C.A., where this Court or the Utah 
Court of Appeals reviews the decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission for correctness and/or abuse of discretion. Instead, it 
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is a brand new proceeding which, in effect, vacates the decision of 
the Tax Commission and puts the parties back at "square one" where 
evidence may again be taken and the district court may make its 
decision based on the evidence in front of it. The only 
restrictions on evidence to be presented is that witnesses who are 
not called in front of the Utah State Tax Commission may not be 
called to testify in the District Court, nor may new exhibits be 
introduced, unless the parties agree in writing, or unless the 
District Court first remands the case to the Commission to hear the 
additional witnesses or view the additional exhibits, which may 
then be presented in the District Court. The obvious intent of 
that section is to avoid a litigant putting on nothing but a pro 
forma appearance in front of the tax Commission and not giving them 
enough evidence on which to base a decision. If there is 
substantial new evidence which may have affected the Tax Commission 
ruling if it had been heard there, the Commission is given the 
opportunity to hear that evidence and modify their decision. This 
view is supported by the very excerpts from the legislative 
committee hearings which were cited by Appellant in their brief and 
inserted as an appendix thereto. 
The testimony of Jim Lee was that the language of the bill was 
"a compromise" which required that a litigant in district court was 
"pretty much held to no further evidence and no further witnesses" 
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which had not been presented to the Tax Commission. (Appellant's 
Appendix 4 at p. 2) . That was further clarified and supported by 
the testimony of Senator Stephenson that the procedure was an. 
effort that: 
. . . bent over backwards to make sure that nobody who appeals 
to the commission does so with the effort to just bypass the 
Commission. They have their chance. They have the opportunity 
to hear everything, and if they don't then unless it's 
otherwise agreed in writing, the court will remand that back 
to the Commission, and say you didn't present that, so you 
have to go back to the Commission and give them their 
opportunity to hear everything.... (Appellant's appendix at 
p.17). 
The Commission would now have the Court believe that this 
statute was adopted with their interests in mind, and that their 
interpretation has to be correct. In fact, the Commission fought 
this bill despite the efforts at "compromise", and now wishes to 
gain by Court action that which they lost in the legislature. 
During the testimony of Commissioner Roger Tew, he objected to the 
procedure in the district court: 
We comply with the Administrative Procedures Act as written. 
We operate under the same rules that everybody else does. 
What's being proposed here is to have us operate under 
different rules. 
What we do have concerns [about] however is that we don't 
think [of] this as necessarily as a cost saving measure, since 
what we're in effect going to be doing is potentially 
relitigating some issues twice. 
Before the Administrative Procedures Act was passed as 
determined the last judicial proceedings that were held under 
the old tax court acts they were not de novo proceedings. 
They were on the record proceedings. And if the legislation 
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had the option of going to District Court on the record, I 
suppose the Tax commission would be in a much more difficult 
posture [in opposing it] than we are with the proposed 
legislation. 
Again there are some proponents, there's some aspects of the 
legislation that we don't oppose. (Appellant's Appendix 4, p. 
9). (Emphasis added). 
The legislation did contain some non-controversial provisions 
not at issue here which the Commission did not oppose; but the Tax 
Commission opposed the provisions which they now say should be 
construed in their favor. These provisions were opposed because 
they did exactly what Petitioner says they did; and those points 
were specifically referred to by Commissioner Tew in his opposing 
statement. 
Commissioner Tew was accompanied and followed by Brian Tarbet 
of the Attorney General's office. Mr. Tarbet, also speaking for 
the Commission, followed up on the same concerns: 
I find it interesting that in the interest of saving the 
taxpayer money we're going to add two new levels. 
Now in District Court you're not going to have controllers and 
CPA's, you're going to have attorneys representing these 
folks. 
If they go to the District Court, they're going to end up with 
fourteen or fifteen judges who have limited tax experience, 
who don't like tax cases, and that's why 59-1-601, the tax 
court was done away with just last year, because they didn't 
want these cases. You will not get good tax policy out of 
this goulash that you'll have over at the District Court. 
(Appellant's Appendix 4, p. 10). 
In testimony before the legislative committee, the Commission 
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made its discomfort with the scope and type of review in the 
district court obvious. They argued that the same matter was going 
to be litigated twice (true), that the new trial was not going to 
be "on the record" (also true) and that the district courts would 
thereafter have a much bigger say in tax policy (again true) as 
opposed to the "professionals" in the Commission itself. Those 
arguments were all considered by the committee; and they were 
rejected. Somehow, the Commission, in bringing this appeal, hopes 
to make all of that history disappear, and to have the act reformed 
to meet the objections which have already been overruled by the 
legislature. This is an exercise in cynicism; and this Court 
should not support it. If the Commission has problems with the 
legislation, they should go back to the legislature and try again. 
This is not the forum for such changes. 
The position of the Commission as to the nature of the 
district Court proceeding is a result of misconstruing the term 
"record". When the code refers to the district court proceeding 
as "an original, independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial 
do novo on the record", the term "record" seems to include a 
transcript or tape of evidence taken at the Tax Commission 
proceeding. Some confusion may have crept into the procedure, 
because of the use of that word in the governing statute. 
Appellant uses the word throughout its brief to include a 
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transcript; and then goes the extra mile in saying it is up to 
Appellee herein to supply it! Rule 4-202.01(9) (a) of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration defines the term as including "books, 
letters, documents, papers," etc. In short, it refers to the 
material accumulated by the court in its file on the case. 
The Tax Commission is thus ordered to turn over its file, including 
books, letters, documents, papers, etc, to the district court; and 
the district court is to review and consider that file. Without 
such a file, the district court is without pleadings, memoranda, 
and other materials outlining both the legal issues and the facts 
set forth by the litigants. Without that "record", the court 
doesn't even have the basic information as to why the taxpayer 
thinks the taxes have been wrongfully assessed. Because the trial 
court, however, is conducting an "original, independent 
proceeding", it does not need to review a transcript of evidence 
put on in the earlier proceeding. This new proceeding will make 
its own "record" (including tapes or shorthand transcription) which 
will be the basis of any appeal. This is not an appeal, and is 
differentiated from one in the code. The trial judge will hear the 
witnesses himself, and will judge their credibility. As observed 
by this Court in Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991): 
The district court's findings of fact are based upon a 
judgment of the credibility of the witnesses. It is the 
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, and we will not second-guess the court's findings 
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when there is a reasonable basis to support its findings. In 
order to challenge the court's findings of fact, the defendant 
must marshal all of the evidence in favor of the findings and 
then demonstrate that even when reviewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. 806 P.2d at 1184. 
That standard is specifically imposed on this Court in matters 
involving a direct appeal from formal proceedings before the Tax 
Commission by § 63-46b-16 (4) (g) U.C.A. This Court, in such a 
direct appeal from the Tax Commission, may redetermine issues of 
fact only if: 
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made 
or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; 
If the Commission succeeds in taking some of the originality 
and some of the independence out of the "original, independent 
proceeding", it will not be hard for the Commission to argue that 
the actual trier of fact was in a better position to judge 
credibility and therefore must be granted deference. That 
determination would act to severely compromise the proceeding in 
the District Court, completely contrary to the intent of the 
legislature. 
Appellee has attached as part of the addendum to this brief, 
the "Request for Record" of Appellant herein. That request is for 
four enumerated items: The "record" of the proceedings before the 
Tax Commission and district court (numbers one and three) and 
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"transcripts" of proceedings in front of the two tribunals. At 
this point, even Appellant recognizes that the "record" does not 
include a transcript, unless the transcript is separately 
specified. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also 
reinforces the position of petitioner regarding the nature of the 
"record". That rule sets forth that the "record" of the 
proceedings below, includes the index, the docket sheet, the 
original papers, published depositions and "all transcripts 
prepared for appeal". The Rules of Appellate Procedure do not 
apply here; and there is no authority in any code provision or rule 
for the suggestion that a transcript is required. The Tax 
Commission is required to put the record of pleadings together and 
send it over to the district court. While there is no mention of 
it in the law, there appears to be no bar to either side obtaining 
a transcript for use in impeachment, much the same as with the use 
of depositions; but it is not a required part of the record. 
The Commission ingeniously refers to the case of Archer v. 
Board of Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995) for the 
proposition that, because this is a review of a formal proceeding 
in the Tax Commission, it differs in scope and type from the review 
of the informal proceeding referred to there. There is no support 
in the Archer decision for that argument. In fact, the legislature 
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has required specifically the same type of de novo trial in the 
district court after the Tax Commission's formal proceeding as 
after the informal proceeding in Archer. The legislature did not 
have to do that; and up until recently, it did not. The 
legislative record referred to above is, however, full of reasons 
for it so doing. The Tax Commission unsuccessfully used many of 
the same arguments in Archer that it is using here, in an effort to 
avoid a full trial de novo in the district court. In Archer, the 
Court said: 
In other words, the State argues that the district court's de 
novo review of an informal proceeding should defer to the 
reasonable exercise of statutorily delegated discretion to the 
Division. We disagree. 
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the rule previously 
used in two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals 
establishing the right to a new trial without deference to the 
determinations of an informal administrative proceeding. 907 
P.2d at 1144. 
The legislature has specifically provided for the same rule 
here; and they have made that clear to the degree that even the Tax 
Commission should see it. Their failure to do so only attests to 
their single minded purpose of making their job of tax collection 
easier, and of making the job of a taxpayer in contesting their 
actions more difficult. 
The Tax Commission, in one last attempt to gain something out 
of this statute, cites University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 
736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997). They suggest that their interpretation 
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will allow the district court to conduct "another trial" and to 
exercise considerable discretion as to how it will be conducted. 
In fact, the district court has clearly and firmly said how it 
intends to conduct this trial, something that the State says should 
be left to the trial court's discretion. But the Commission 
somehow maintains that this discretion should not be allowed. The 
argument is utterly without merit, and without the "common sense" 
that it purports to represent. 
Finally, the Commission argues that an interpretation of the 
law inconsistent with its own may potentially run afoul of the 
Constitution of Utah, particularly Article XIII, Section 11, 
defining the powers of the Tax Commission. Nowhere do they argue 
that this is a case of potential conflict; because it is not. The 
courts of this state clearly do have the power of oversight over 
the actions of the Commission and other agencies, to avoid the 
agencies overstepping their bounds. Clearly, the courts have been 
specifically empowered to make independent decisions which may have 
the effect of overruling Commission decisions in a myriad of 
situations. The few and specific areas where this Court has 
forbidden the lower courts to interfere with Tax Commission 
decisions are not relevant here. Actions of the legislature are 
entitled to the presumption of constitutionality; and there is not 
a conflict between the statute and the Constitution of Utah, as the 
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statute is applied here. Whether there are some instances where 
such conflict might arise is a matter not to be speculated upon 
within the confines of this case. 
POINT II 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR PETITIONER TO PAY THE DISPUTED TAX BEFORE 
PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT ON A TRIAL DE NOVO. 
Respondent cites § 59-1-505 U.C.A. for the proposition that 
Petitioner in this proceeding has liability for the tax, interest 
and penalties before being allowed to proceed herein. That 
provision is clearly at odds with the statute which governs this 
action, and was not designed to apply to this action. This type of 
action did not exist when § 505 was enacted. At that time, the 
only "judicial review" was through the provisions of § 63-46b-16 
U.C.A., which uses the term "judicial review" throughout to 
characterize an appellate proceeding to the Supreme Court or Court 
of Appeals "governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. " 
§ 59-1-601 ends by saying "this subsection supersedes § 63-
46b-l6 pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings." § 59-1-601 is an alternative method to that of a 
direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court; 
and such an appeal on the record may still be made if the aggrieved 
party chooses that alternative. That fact is set forth on face of 
the Order of the Utah State Tax Commission itself which states: 
NOTICE: You have thirty (3 0) days from the date of a 
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final order to file a.) a Petition for Judicial Review in the 
Supreme Court, or b.) a Petition for Judicial Review by trial 
de novo in district court. 
The right to appeal to this Court or the Utah Court of Appeal 
is specifically preserved for those who choose a trial de novo, by 
§§ 59-1-607 and 608. § 59-1-607 is particularly important when it 
states: 
Unless stayed, the decision of the district court shall be 
binding upon all parties until changed upon appeal. 
No language exists giving the Commission decision the same 
finality if a trial de novo is requested; and that silence is 
indeed deafening. The "original" and de novo proceeding renders 
the judgment below null and void and of no effect. The trial court 
was procedurally and legally correct in issuing a stay of any 
enforcement proceedings taken by the Commission under its own 
order. This being an "original, independent proceeding," there 
is no final decision from the Tax Commission in the sense that the 
Order is enforceable and the judgment collectible, certainly at 
least if the district court issues a stay as has been done here. 
In short, all of the provisions applying to the appellate 
procedure are superseded by this proceeding; and that applies to § 
59-1-505, which refers to "judicial review" as a synonym for 
"appeal". The major difference between the procedures is that an 
appeal to this Court or the Court of Appeals preserves a 
presumption of the validity of the Commission decision. No such 
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presumption of validity exists when a de novo proceeding is 
commenced; and it would be completely contrary to the nature of the 
proceeding to enforce the payment of taxes without that 
presumption. 
The argument made by Appellant is effectively that this 
continues to be an appellate proceeding under the administrative 
procedures act (admittedly with some exceptions) . That argument is 
preposterous. If this action had been meant to be part of the 
administrative procedures act, it would have been within that act. 
An appeal pursuant to § 63-46b-15 U.C.A. et seq. allows the 
appellate court to overturn the decision of the commission only in 
specific circumstances outlined in § 63-46b-l6 U.C.A. It is a 
proceeding on the record, and is geared to correcting legal errors 
made by the commission. This proceeding is an entirely new type of 
proceeding, and is an alternative available to someone aggrieved by 
the Tax Commission's rulings, without conceding the finality and 
validity of any rulings by the Commission. Because of the wholly 
different nature of this proceeding, the deposit of the taxes, or 
the obtaining of a supersedeas appeal bond, is not necessary, 
appropriate or contemplated. Note that the 1996 legislature 
eliminated the strict requirement of a deposit of taxes in an 
appellate proceeding, and settled for the posting of a bond. 
Respondent cites the Utah Supreme Court case of Jensen v. Tax 
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Commission, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992) as suggesting that the Utah 
Supreme Court has upheld its position. That, of course, is not 
true. That case came down two years before the statute under which 
we are proceeding was passed. It did not contemplate the type of 
proceeding at issue here. Certainly construing the law as 
Respondent wishes is not consistent with the right to obtain such 
a review. Requiring it would put a burden on the litigant which 
would preclude many from exercising their rights hereunder and 
would substantially abridge the additional rights given to the 
taxpayer by the enactment of the new statute. The Commission 
clearly is attempting to transform an original, independent 
proceeding into an appellate one, in which all advantage is on the 
side of the Commission. 
During the testimony of Brian Tarbet before the legislative 
committee, he referred to the fact that § 59-1-301 of the Utah Code 
already gives the taxpayer the right to go to the District Court, 
by paying the taxes first and suing to get them back (Appellant's 
Appendix 4, p. 10) . The implication is that this new procedure was 
not needed. If all this section did was to grant to the taxpayer 
what he already had, Mr. Tarbet would be correct. Obviously, this 
statute must do more; and it does. As observed by Charles Brown, 
a tax attorney who testified in favor of the bill: 
Mr. Tew and his fellow Commissioners are honest honorable 
people, but everyday when they hear a one side of the case 
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they have their staff people whose salaries they may raise 
[inaudible] based on who they have coffee with, they might 
ride up in the elevator with, on the other side they have 
people they don't know. As honest as they want to be, as 
honorable as they want to be, there's going to be a pretty 
good subconscious bias there. These exact issues were 
analyzed by Congress in coming up with the federal system. In 
the federal system you have the right to go to the United 
States Tax Court without paying the tax, I might add, and you 
get a trial de novo by a judge. The system we have now we 
feel like a trial [inaudible] Mr. Hilliard having a case 
before a judge and having all the parties on the other side be 
members of the judges staff. A good trial attorney would ask 
that judge to recuse himself because there's definitely an 
inherent unfairness there. 
The present system is unfair, because there is no opportunity 
for an independent trier to hear the cases. . . . (Appellant's 
Appendix 4, p. 10) (Emphasis added). 
Even assuming the tortured interpretations of the law sought 
by Respondent are accepted by this court, dismissal would not be 
appropriate. The Utah Supreme Court has not required a deposit of 
the taxes "prior to seeking judicial review" but only as a 
condition for proceeding; and the legislature has modified the 
requirement to include the use of a bond. That is borne out in the 
language quoted by Respondent which requires (in an appellate 
proceeding only) the deposit to be made "when a taxpayer is able to 
meet the requirement". If this court were to accept the 
interpretation by the Respondent, Petitioner would still have a 
reasonable time to deposit the taxes, to post a bond, or to 
petition the trial court for a determination that the requirement 
should be waived because of hardship. 
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POINT III 
IT IS THE TAX COMMISSION WHICH MUST PROVIDE THE RECORD OF ITS 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE DISTRICT COURT, AND NOT THE PETITIONER. 
Respondent also makes the claim that the Petition in the 
District Court should be dismissed because Petitioner has not 
requested a transcript of the proceedings in the Utah State Tax 
Commission. That is an incredible assertion in light of the 
language quoted by Respondent which clearly states "...the 
Commission shall certify a record of its proceedings to the 
district court..." (emphasis added) It is the Commission which 
must certify a record of its proceedings to the district court, and 
not the Petitioner; and there is no other way to read that statute. 
There is absolutely nothing in this law that suggests any duty 
whatsoever on the part of Petitioner; and the Petitioner therefore 
has no duty. Petitioner, of course, dose not have the access to 
the record which such a duty would require. It is true that an 
appellant in an appellate proceeding ordinarily has the obligation 
to order a transcript if one is necessary. Petitioner suggests 
that the language of the controlling statute, in omitting any such 
duty, only reinforces Petitioner's position as to the nature of 
this proceeding. Only by referring to the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure can such a duty be imposed on Petitioner; and those rules 
have been specifically superseded in this proceeding. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial in this matter, to be held in the Third District 
Court, is indeed a trial de novo in all respects. This Court 
should order the trial held in the same manner that the Third 
District Court would try any case filed therein in exercise of its 
original jurisdiction. Because of the nature of that proceeding, 
there is no presumption of finality or correctness to be given the 
order of the Utah State Tax Commission; and no appellate bond or 
prepayment of taxes assessed by the Tax Commission is required to 
proceed in the District Court. Any transcript ordered by either 
party is voluntary only, and may be used as would a deposition. 
DATED this ^ / d a y of November, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 
439 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 11 
(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as 
it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks 
jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment or order which is the 
subject of review, if it plainly appears that no substantial question is pre-
sented; or may summarily reverse in cases of manifest error. 
(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary 
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment inserted "or an order granting a petition 
under Rule 5(e)" in Subdivision (a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Summary affirmance. 
. Summary affirmance under this rule is a de-
Dismissal by court. termination of the appeal on its merits, after 
Permissive nature of motion.
 t h e p a r t i e 8 h a v e b e e n af^ed a full and ade-
Summary affirmance.
 q u a t e opportunity to present relevant argu-
Time for filing. ments and authorities. An appellate court's re-
Cited, jection of appellant's contentions as unmerito-
Dismissal by court r*o u s does n o t deny n i m ^ 8 right of appeal. 
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See £pp 1988); State v Palmer 786 P.2d 248 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. < U ^ ? v £ p P
 D
1 9
^
}
 ideC*ded ^ ^ f o n n e r 
Ann 1987) R u * e 1 0 , ^ ^ R* ^ APP'^ 
PP
" , Time for filing. 
Permissive nature of motion. A motion for summary disposition that is 
Appellate court's lack of jurisdiction to con- clearly meritorious supports a suspension of 
sider defendant's cross-appeal was not waived the time limitation contained in this rule, 
by plaintiffs failure to move for dismissal un- Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
der Subdivision (a). This rule is permissive, not 1990). 
mandatory, and a lack of subject matter juris- Cited in Benchmark, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
diction cannot be waived. Glezos v. Frontier Valley Mental Health Bd., Inc., 830 P.2d 218 
Inv., 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). (Utah 1991). 
Rule 11, The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and ex-
hibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index 
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute 
the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of 
the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as 
the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this 
rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial 
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with colla-
tion in the following order: 
(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(B) the docket sheet; 
(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; and 
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order. 
(2) (A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of 
the collated record with a sequential number using one series of 
numerals for the entire record. 
(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, 
the clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the 
supplemental record in the same order as the original record and 
mark the bottom right corner of each page of the collated supplemen-
tal record with a sequential number beginning with the number next 
following the number of the last page of the original record. 
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(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The 
index shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper was filed in 
the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the paper will 
be found., 
(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and 
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the 
parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply 
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be in-
cluded by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall 
consist of the following. 
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the 
papers, excluding any transcripts, total fewer than 300 pages, all of 
the papers will be transmitted to the appellate court upon completion 
of the filing of briefs. In such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the 
clerk of the trial court, simultaneously with the filing of appellant's 
reply brief, notice of the date on which appellant's reply brief was 
filed. If appellant does not intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall 
notify the clerk of the trial court of that fact within 30 days of the 
filing of appellee's brief. 
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers, 
excluding any transcripts, are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall 
file with the clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is 
completed, a joint or separate designation of those papers referred to 
in their respective briefs. Only those designated papers and the fol-
lowing, to the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of 
the appellate court by the clerk of the trial court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined m Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(lii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from 
which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of 
law filed or delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon 
which the court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer 
than 300 pages, the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate 
court. Where all papers in the agency record total 300 or more pages, the 
parties shall, within 10 days after briefing is completed, file with the 
agency a joint or separate designation of those papers necessary to the 
appeal. The agency shall transmit those designated papers to the appel-
late court. Instead of filing all papers or designated papers, the agency 
may, with the approval of the court, file only the chronological index of 
the record or of such parts of the record as the parties may designate. All 
parts of the record retained by the agency shall be considered part of the 
record on review for all purposes. 
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(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice 
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after fil-
ing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within 
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and 
the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a 
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed 
format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceed-
ings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a 
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with 
the clerk of the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceed-
ings were otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court 
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the 
Judicial Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already 
on file as the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties 
approved by the appellate court, a person other than a certified court 
transcriber may transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate 
court shall, upon request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. 
The transcriber is subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by 
these rules. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obli-
gated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions 
of the transcript. 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the 
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days 
after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be 
presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request 
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a tran-
script of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, 
within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the 
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation 
of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of 
such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so noti-
fied the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either 
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the 
appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall 
make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter or transcriber for pay-
ment of the cost of the transcript. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on 
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and 
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal 
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the 
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision 
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together 
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present 
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court 
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon 
approval of the statement by the trial court. 
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(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made 
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceed-
ings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the 
appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on 
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days 
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall 
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and 
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as 
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from 
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the 
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmit-
ted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if neces-
sary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties 
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party 
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the 
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The rule is 
amended to make applicable in the Supreme 
Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for 
preparing a transcript where the record is 
maintained by an electronic recording device. 
The rule is modified slightly from the former 
Court of Appeals rule to make it the appel-
lant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsi-
bility to arrange for the preparation of the 
transcript. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the sec-
ond sentence in Subdivision (a) and made sty-
listic changes in the third sentence; in Subdivi-
sion (b) inserted "and any transcript" and sub-
stituted "a chronological index" for "an alpha-
betical index" m the first sentence and added 
the third sentence; and in Subdivision (d) de-
leted "and Exhibits" from the heading, deleted 
ANALYSIS 
Correction or modification. 
—Supplemental record. 
Notice of transmission. 
Purpose. 
—Supplementation denied. 
Evidence. 
Incomplete record. 
Statement where transcript unavailable. 
—Adequacy of procedures. 
Right to appeal. 
Transcript. 
—Factual matters. 
—Purpose of rule. 
Cited. 
Correction or modification. 
—Supplemental record. 
In considering a motion to supplement the 
"original" before "papers" m four places, re-
wrote the introductory paragraph in Subdivi-
sion (2), deleting a second sentence similar to 
the new third sentence in Subdivision (b), de-
leted "by the parties, as set forth in Rule 
12(b)(2)" from the end of the first sentence in 
Subdivision (2)(A), and added Subdivision (3). 
The 1994 amendment deleted "where avail-
able" before "the docket sheet" in Subdivision 
(a); subdivided Subdivision (b) and rewrote 
Subdivision (b)(1); inserted "excluding any 
transcripts" near the beginning of Subdivisions 
(d)(2)(A) and (B); and added the third sentence 
in Subdivision (e)(1) and the second sentence in 
Subdivision (e)(2). 
The 1995 amendment inserted "or if the ap-
pellant is impecunious and unable to afford a 
transcript in a civil case" in Subdivision (g). 
record, the appellate court should evaluate sev-
eral factors. These include the need for the sup-
plemental material, prior opportunity to intro-
duce the supplemental material, and length of 
the resulting delay. Under appropriate circum-
stances and in the interest of judicial economy, 
the court will deny a motion to supplement the 
record. Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P.2d 428 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
The trial court properly supplemented the 
record with respect to the circumstances sur-
rounding the question of whether defendant 
waived his right to a jury trial, when the trial 
court had the parties submit proffers of evi-
dence in the form of affidavits to the trial judge 
stating the recollection each had of the arcum-
stances surrounding the waiver. State v, 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). 
Notice of transmission. 
Although this rule does not require notice to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
